Realpolitik – or the triumph of ruthless pragmatism in pursuit of national ends – is a word correctly associated with Germany’s “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck, whose 19 years in office (1871-1890) forged the modern German state.

Popularly, but apparently incorrectly, attributed to Bismarck is the aphorism: “Anyone who loves the law or sausages should never watch either of them being made.”

The last 24 days intended to birth the newfangled multiparty government of national unity was Bismarckian in both respects.

As one of many midwives involved in this messy process, several “rough first drafts of history” can be sketched.

First, in any negotiation it is imperative that the good faith of your future partners be respected; indeed “utmost good faith” is the cornerstone of the law of partnership.

Of course, we are talking here about politics not law, strictly speaking. And good faith tends to erode when – contra a business negotiation – the full volume of background noise is cranked up on social media and, for example, via the poison pens masquerading as journalists in the fetid media house headed by Iqbal Surve.

No social media 

As an aside on that point: I was asked in a recent interview how these current negotiations differed from the 1991-1996 Kempton Park and Constitutional Assembly talks in which I was also involved, and which produced our Constitution.

One of several key distinctions is that back in the heady and dramatic late 1990s there was no social media to mischaracterise positions, and no clickbait to weaponise legitimate differences and no “influencers” to relentlessly peddle propaganda.

However, there was one exchange on Monday on X, previously Twitter, which is worth reprising since it goes to the heart of the matter in the current standoff (as of Thursday midday) between the ANC and the DA on the formation of the GNU and who participates in it. It also was, mercifully, absent the race-holding and name-calling of other exchanges on this often-toxic platform.

President Cyril Ramphosa’s spokesperson, Vincent Magwenya, wrote:

There is no constitutional provision that prescribes for a proportional allocation of cabinet positions. Section 91(3) of the Constitution gives the president the prerogative to appoint cabinet members.

Helen Zille, executive chair of the DA, grossly misrepresented by some of X’s other keyboard warriors as a cartoonish evil wicked white witch of the West etc, responded with a deadly one-line riposte: “There is the small matter of the agreement signed on 14 June.”

This leads to the second takeaway of recent days: the “statement of intent of the 2024 government of national unity” agreed and signed by both ANC and DA on 14 June, and subsequently by other parties.

It was based on that agreement and only because of its wording and intent, that the DA voted for Cyril Ramaphosa as president of South Africa on the same day (and also for Panyaza Lesufi as premier of Gauteng and for the installation of a provincial government in KwaZulu-Natal which excluded the MK Party).

It is passing strange, to put matters at their mildest, that Ramaphosa’s own spokesperson wrote as though the agreement (which legally informs the president’s prerogative powers) simply does not exist. Or as Peter Bruce, veteran commentator, wrote in Business Day on 27 June: “All pretence aside, it was the [DA} which was the sole guarantor of Ramaphosa’s election as president two weeks ago.”

In the seven stages of grief 

But pretending that Ramaphosa heads a government (yet to be formed) in which his party has 70% of the votes rather than the 40% it actually achieved, suggests that the ANC is still at step one of the seven stages of grief (“shock and denial”). Stages six and seven are where more realistic South Africans exist and provide the necessary pillars for a stable government. (“reconstruction and working through” and “acceptance and hope”).

Grief counselling aside, the 14 June agreement has, since it was signed, become a sort of radioactive nuclear weapon, which, without careful handling, can explode over the future prospects of our country.

The most important clause in it (for the purpose of forming an inclusive and stable GNU) is clause 16 which provides:

The government of national unity shall be constituted in a manner that reflects genuine inclusiveness of political parties that are party to [this agreement] and are represented in the National Assembly broadly taking into account the number of seats parties have in the National Assembly and the need to advance the national interest. The president shall in constituting the Executive, take into account the electoral outcome.

This clause would not win an award for elegance of language nor concision, it was the result of last-minute wrangling between the ANC and DA – the settlement of which ensured Ramaphosa’s election as president.

And doubtless, while the ANC emphasises the adverb (“broadly”) and the DA the term “electoral outcomes” – it is quite clear that both are applicable.

And on even the broadest interpretation, at some point if genuine power sharing rather than co-option is to be achieved and to endure, then the “will of the people” expressed through the ballot box needs reflection in the composition of the new government.

Simply to reflect accurately such outcomes in a cabinet of 30 members, for example, would mean 17 ministers for the ANC, nine for the DA, two for the IFP, one for the PA, and one for the FF Plus.

Since other parties to the agreement, such as PAC and GOOD, would not obtain entry to Cabinet since they achieved too few votes, their entrance could only be ensured via the two largest parties contributing proportionally by shedding their proportional share of cabinet seats to enable this.

Delicate juncture 

Of course, that is the arithmetic of the situation. But back to Bismarck’s realpolitik we have arrived at a delicate juncture where – precisely to serve the national rather than just the narrow party interest, the DA has (as has now appeared in the public domain) been prepared to shed one-third of its proportional entitlement (nine) down to six. On current proposals, of all participating parties, only the DA will shed its proportional share to achieve an inclusive outcome. But this simply deals with the quantitative aspect.

On the qualitative aspect, obviously the party should obtain sufficient portfolios of heft and the modalities of executive operations to allow it to achieve as a full and legitimate participant in government, the change in people’s lives it offered to voters.

It would be inapt here to interrogate what was offered by whom and when in this regard. Though I do recall my former legal mentor, the late Philip Pencharz, once noting of a difficult client: “He simply regards a written agreement as the basis for further negotiation!”

Finally, on the third takeaway and subject to the caveat that in the current swirl of events, this might be a moot point:

The ANC correctly and frequently reminds us; it is the largest party in the government in waiting. Very true but it is a 40% not a 70% party; conversely the DA is only a 22% party, but it is not a 2% party either. (In fact, all other eight parties which have signed on to join the GNU only bring with them, collectively, 8.5% of the seats in Parliament.)

No perfect choice

So, one month after the election, the ANC needs to make a legitimate choice, and it is that party’s choice to make: does it want a stable inclusive government which commands a decent majority in Parliament and where parties are committed to both the foundational principles and programme of priorities embedded in the statement of intent? These include respect for the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in its entirety, sustainable economic growth, a more just society, stabilising local government and integrity, good governance and accountable government.

Striking a fair deal with the DA provides both stability and the chance of implementing the principles and the programme above.

There are two other alternatives open to the ANC: on the one hand, it can strike a deal with the EFF and/or MKP as some in the party (and the Surve media house) hope. This will give the government a sort of security in numbers, though looking at the local government accords not too much of it. But it certainly won’t achieve most of the principles and programmes outlined in the agreement the ANC signed two weeks back. In fact, it will be a violation of them.

The other option is to ignore the second (DA), third (MKP), and fourth (EFF) largest parties in Parliament and limp along as a minority government, hostage vote-by-parliamentary- vote to the vagaries of uncertain outcomes.

None of these choices are either perfect or even very good for any of the parties.  But choosing the worst outcome is the surest recipe for future country failure. We will know soon enough.